This paper investigates whether external political pressures for faster renminbi (RMB) appreciation have any statistically significant effect on both the daily returns and the conditional volatility of the RMB central parity rate. We construct external pressure indicators pertaining to the RMB exchange rate, with a special emphasis on US pressures, to test the hypothesis. After controlling for domestic macroeconomic news, we find that external political pressures, including US-specific ones do not have a significant influence on RMB's daily returns. However, evidence suggests that external pressures, and especially those from the US, have statistically significant impacts on the conditional volatility of the RMB. Furthermore, we conduct the same exercise on the RMB non-deliverable forward rate (NDF). We find that the NDF market is highly responsive to macroeconomic news and political pressures and there is some weak evidence that non-US political pressures affect the daily returns of the NDF.
Introduction
The Chinese currency, renminbi or yuan (RMB or CNY), had been appreciating at a gradual pace against the US dollar (USD) since the exchange rate reform on 21 July 2005 until the eruption of the global financial crisis in September 2008. The RMB exchange rate reform, which switched from a USD peg to a "managed float" against a basket of currencies, has been based on the principles of "independent initiative, controllability, and gradual progress" despite of having gone through various phases of faster or slower appreciations (Liu and Pauwels, 2007) . 2 The RMB appreciated by 3.4% in 2006 and a further 6.9% in 2007 against the USD. Overall, the CNY/USD exchange rate has appreciated by more than 18% by the end of 2008.
The reformed RMB exchange rate offers a rare opportunity to study an exchange rate arrangement that is gaining greater importance in the world foreign exchange markets and yet it is still largely subjected to government policy and the political environment. Furthermore, RMB's move to greater flexibility is taking place while the currency is not yet fully convertible; China's capital controls are still in place; and China's financial institutions are not yet liberalised. It is in part because of these features that the price formation mechanism of the RMB is yet fully market driven. Meanwhile, considerable external pressures, particularly motivated by global economic imbalances, have been exerted on the Chinese authorities to allow for more rapid appreciation of the RMB.
A question that naturally arises is whether such pressures have actually brought about any tangible effects on the daily movements of the CNY/USD exchange rate. Specifically, we assess whether external political pressures have any statistically significant influence on the daily returns as well as on conditional volatility of the CNY/USD central parity rate, after controlling for domestic macroeconomic news such as monetary conditions, economic activity, and external imbalances. Furthermore, we also assess the effect of external political pressures on market expectations using the non-deliverable forward (NDF) rates. Political pressures and domestic macroeconomic news may induce the market participants to revise their expectations of what the CNY/USD exchange rate will be in the near term. In addition, the NDF offers two main advantages over the central parity rate: first, the market is in offshore and therefore it is free of government control and second, the market market is highly liquid.
We define external political pressures as policy statements or announcements by foreign officials and international organizations demanding for faster appreciation of the RMB exchange rate. The pressures are quantified with indicator variables based on a newly constructed dataset. We build the dataset by collecting public statements about the Chinese exchange rate made by senior officials either from key economies in the world or various international organizations. For example, these statements may come from the President of the United States, Secretaries of the US Treasury and Department of Commerce, Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, influential US congressmen and senators, prime ministers and senior economic officials from the EU and the Japanese government, as well as head of important international organisations with focus on global economy such as the IMF and the OECD.
An event study methodology is applied to investigate the issue addressed in this paper. Indeed, there is a growing body of literature that uses event studies with high frequency data to evaluate effects of "news" in foreign exchange markets. Neely (2005) provides an excellent review of recent studies, especially those pertaining to central bank intervention in foreign exchange rate markets. While many event studies examine the efficacy of actual central bank interventions in foreign exchange markets (for example, Hutchinson (2003a and 2003b) , Ito and Yabu (2004) , and Chaboud and Humpage (2005) to name a few recent studies), our paper falls into the category of the event studies literature that examines whether news or central bank communications have any impact on the daily exchange rate movements. Fratzscher (2004) , among others, assesses the effectiveness of central bank communication policies on the exchange rates of G-3 economies and finds that such policies are effective in influencing dollar-euro and yen-dollar in the desired directions on intervention days. Fratzscher's results also suggest that central bank communications tend to reduce market volatility, whereas actual interventions increase market volatility. On the other hand, Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Dominguez (1998) find that news report of Japanese government interventions tend to increase exchange rate volatility.
The contributions of this paper to the existing literature are as follows: first, unlike the existing literature on foreign exchange interventions that mostly examines the effect of domestic interventions on domestic currencies, this paper investigates the effect of external (foreign) political pressures from G-3 and international organizations on an exchange rate of a large emerging market economy that is gaining prominence in the global economy. Secondly, we construct various indicators that quantify the external pressures calling for faster RMB appreciation based on a new dataset that collates news events related to the RMB exchange rate issues since its reform in July 2005. Thirdly, we use a set of macroeconomic control variables that allow us to better identify the effect of external pressures on the daily returns of the RMB exchange rate. Specifically, we use the deviations of real-time data from market expectations or macroeconomic surprises to control for the underlying macroeconomic factors.
Our findings suggest that statements by officials in the US, EU or Japan do not seem to have a significant impact on daily returns of both the CNY/USD central parity rate and the NDF rate. However, there is some evidence that the NDF rate may react to non-US pressures directed at the RMB exchange rate policy. There is strong evidence that foreign pressures do affect the daily conditional volatility of the CNY/USD central parity and the NDF rate significantly. Out of the underlying domestic factors, we find that interest rate differential between one-month LIBOR and CHIBOR has a significant impact on the pace of appreciation of the central parity rate. We also find that domestic macroeconomic surprises affect significantly the NDF rate but not the central parity rate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview on the RMB exchange rate policy and our data. Section 3 specifies the empirical model. Section 4 interprets our findings. Section 5 discusses the potential issues encountered in interpreting the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2. The RMB exchange rate reform and the data 2.1 Reform of the renminbi exchange rate system On 21 July 2005, the People's Bank of China (PBC) announced a number of measures to reform the renminbi exchange rate regime.
3 On the same day, the currency was re-valued by 2.1% to CNY 8.11 per USD from 8.28. Initially the intra-day fluctuation of the RMB exchange rate against the US dollar was within a tightly controlled range of ±0.3%. The band was subsequently widened to ±0.5% on 18 May 2007. Perhaps the significance of the July reform is that the peg to the USD was replaced by a "managed float" regime, with the exchange rate determined with reference to a basket of currencies. By means of these reforms, the Chinese monetary authority has gained a new policy tool to manage the economy.
Every day, the PBC sets a new reference trading rate, the central parity rate, for the RMB exchange rate against the US dollar. Before 4 January 2006, the central parity rate was announced by the PBC after the closing of the market on each trading day and the announced rate was then used for trading in the following business day. One problem with this procedure was that there was no information as to how the PBC determined the closing price, partly because the transactions were carried out using an automatic price matching system; the China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) was the sole counterparty to all market participants. This approach may not be conducive to the formation mechanism of a market-driven foreign exchange rate system (PBC, 2006) . From 4 January 2006, the setting of the central parity rate has been replaced by a new price mechanism. Three distinct features of the mechanism are worth to mention. First, over-the-counter (OTC) trading was introduced to the interbank foreign exchange market. The OTC system refers to transactions between pairs of accredited market participants via independent bilateral price inquiries and settlements. In the early days of the OTC operations, the automatic price matching system was maintained to facilitate credit authorisation for small and medium sized financial institutions. However, it is expected that the automatic price matching system will be eventually phased out. Secondly, on 4 January 2006, the PBC authorised the CFETS to announce the central parity rate of the RMB against the US dollar, the Euro, the Japanese yen, and the Hong Kong dollar at 9:15 am Beijing time of each business day, whereas prior to January 2006 it had been announced at the market close. Thirdly, the price formation mechanism of the central parity rate was changed substantially. Before the opening of the market on each business day, the CFETS first inquires about prices from all market makers in the OTC system. Based on the information, the highest and lowest offers are excluded and a weighted average of the remaining prices is set as the central parity rate. The weights are determined by the CFETS according to the previous day's transaction volumes of each remaining market maker. In addition, other indicators such as the quoted prices from the automatic price matching system may also be used as a reference. Once the central parity rate is determined against the US dollar, the RMB exchange rate can be set against the euro, the yen, and the Hong Kong dollar based on the cross rates of these currencies with the US dollar at 9:00 am Beijing time in the international exchange rate market. Hence, the determination of the new central parity rate is quite different from the previous one. The mechanism of setting the new central parity rate is more market driven than the one used before 4 January 2006. Due to the change in definition and determination of the central parity rate and for simplicity, we use the daily central parity rate starting from 4 January 2006.
Expectations and the forward exchange rate
While the government-controlled central parity rate provides an interesting avenue to analyse external political pressures on the RMB exchange rate, it will also be useful to compare it with some purely market-driven offshore exchange rate. The RMB non-deliverable forward rate (NDF) is a natural candidate for this exercise.
The NDF rate is the closest available proxy to market expectations of the spot exchange. Unlike the central parity rate, participation in the NDF market is not limited to nominated Chinese institutions only, it is opened to all interested participants in the market, especially those multinational corporations with RMB exposures. Hence, it is purely market driven. The RMB NDF contracts are similar to forward foreign exchange transactions where a principal amount, a forward rate, and a maturity date are included in the contract. Unlike a typical forward rate, the settlements for the RMB NDF rate are usually made in USD at the time of maturity to reflect the difference between the agreed forward rate and the actual spot rate. 4 The NDF markets for the RMB are highly liquid and active in Hong Kong and Singapore. We only present the results for 12-month NDF rates in the Hong Kong market.
5 Similar to other currency markets, the NDF markets are opened 24 hours a day. The reference rates are usually measured by Bloomberg at the end of the trading day of three different time zones: Tokyo (at 20:00 hours), London (at 18:00 hours), and New York (at 17:00 hours). We use Tokyo's time zone and on a 5 trading day basis, since it is the closest to Beijing time, and hence coincide with the Chinese trading times. indicates there is a public statement calling for faster renminbi appreciation from a foreign entity or multiple foreign entities. If it is equal to 0, there is no event related to the RMB exchange rate. We also narrow the source of external pressures as referring to those public statements on Chinese exchange rate policy both from the United States and non-US entities such as the European Union, Japan, and major international organizations such as the IMF, the G7 group, and the OECD. We construct 5 foreign pressure indices from theses sources. We first build an overall external pressure index, which then can be subdivided into two indices, one for the US, one for the non-US, which includes news event on the RMB originating in the EU and Japan, and international organisations. 6 Moreover, we subdivide the US pressure index further by creating one external pressure indicator for the official Sino-US meeting weeks as discussed in section II and another pressure indicator for those statements on the RMB exchange rate policy by US government officials and members of the US Congress. This is done because the US is the most common source of external pressures calling for faster appreciation of the renminbi exchange rate, and the reaction in China to pressures originating in the United States might differ from the reaction to those originating elsewhere.
The foreign pressure indicators are constructed by collating daily news headlines concerning the renminbi exchange rate from the Reuters news database for the period between 22 July 2005 and 31 December 2007. 7 When selecting daily news from the Reuters database, we require that it include keywords such as RMB appreciation and RMB exchange rate flexibility. Strictly speaking, currency appreciation and flexibility (i.e. the degree of movement of the exchange rate as permitted by the currency system) are two distinct economic concepts. However, we classify any comments containing the phrase "flexibility" as carrying the same meaning as a faster or larger appreciation because of the backdrop of persistent international pressures for a faster renminbi appreciation during our sample period. In some cases, there are multiple comments calling for faster RMB appreciation from more than one source of foreign entities. Although this constitutes different entries for some specific indicators concerned, the multiple comments are coded as one entry in the overall foreign pressure indicator. This rule also applies to the case when pressures are coming from different sources, for example, the Sino-US meetings, the US government, and the Congress.
The US pressure indicator includes statements not only from the executive branch of the US government but also from Congress, including hearings or proposed bills pertaining to the Chinese RMB exchange rate. The information for this index is gathered from the Library of Congress website. We then search for all bills that contain the keywords "currency" and "exchange rate" in their titles or summaries that were introduced during our sample period, i.e. between the 109th (2005) (2006) and 110th (2007) (2008) Congresses. When selecting the relevant bills pertaining to the RMB exchange rate, we include the bills on the RMB explicitly, for example bills demanding the US government to take actions against China for manipulating its currency, and the bills related to the RMB exchange rate, for example, bills requiring the Congress to clarify the conditions under which a currency may be considered to be "misaligned". All the bills we select fall between these two categories and we exclude the bills that are specifically targeted on other currencies such as the Japanese yen. We quantify all these bills equally so as to avoid judging the political strength of each bill arbitrarily.
In order to track whether there are some differences before, during, and 6 The non-US variable combines the pressures coming from the EU (and its member countries), Japan and international organisations because each of these entities has too few data points on its own. 7 For reasons explained earlier, we conduct the analysis using the sample starting from 4 January 2006. One may wonder whether our findings could suffer from treating all news events equally when quantifying the external political pressure indicators. One way to check this is to see whether there exists a systematic pattern in large daily RMB changes that is consistent with news that bears more important implications than others for the RMB exchange rate. These significant news events could include US congressional bills that may have tangible impact on the Sino-US economic relations, US-China meetings with a focus on the RMB exchange rate, or concerns on the RMB voiced by top EU officials. We therefore present a table that lists both the 10 largest daily appreciations and the 10 largest depreciations of the RMB central parity rate, together with their corresponding news in the week. These 20 large changes in RMB exchange rate account for roughly 4% of the total observations. Table 1 (a) shows the 10 largest appreciations. As we can see, it is difficult to draw any conclusion from these 10 largest appreciations days, as they are not always affected by significant events. In fact, there are just as many days of large appreciations without any events as those days with ones of significance. Indeed, such observations also apply to the 10 largest depreciation days presented in table 1 (b).
[ Table 1 
(a) & (b)]
While we observe that some large depreciation days are associated with no events at all, we also observe that some of the largest depreciation days can be associated with political pressures for faster RMB appreciation. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that the central parity rates would be consistently set in a way that reflects external political pressures of significance. We arrive at the same conclusion for the same experiment conducted on the 12-month NDF rate. Table 2 (a) and (b) show that there is little evidence supporting patterns of more significant news affecting the 12-month NDF rate. That said, our indicators that treat external political pressures equally may not affect our findings much.
[ Table 2 
Domestic control variables
Our framework testing whether foreign pressures have any influence on the RMB exchange rate also requires us to control for the effect of various domestic underlying factors such as the state of monetary conditions, economic activity, and external imbalances. Because the foreign exchange rate market is forward looking, anticipated effects from these domestic underlying factors should not have much influence on daily exchange rate movements. Only unanticipated effects or surprises from these domestic factors should. To control for the effect owing to monetary conditions, we use the loan growth and M2 growth surprises, in addition to the interest rate differential between the US and China. The interest rate differential data is calculated using the daily money market interest rates in the United States (one-month LIBOR) and in Mainland China (one-month CHIBOR), collected from CEIC. The interest rate differential attempts to reflect the interest rate parity condition. 9 To control for the effect of economic activities, we use the surprises from CPI inflation, growth in fixed asset investment, and growth in industrial production. The effect of external balances on the RMB exchange is accounted for by surprises in the monthly changes of China's trade surplus.
10 A detailed description of the data and the definition of the variables are presented in Appendix B1-B4.
How do we measure the surprises from these underlying macroeconomic factors? Except for the interest rate differential variable, all other key macroeconomic indicators are announced on a monthly basis on different official dates. The unanticipated effects of these monthly macroeconomic indicators or macroeconomic surprises on the RMB exchange rate are measured as the differences between the official data on their release dates (real-time data) and their corresponding market forecasts that reflect market expectations.
11 The market forecasts are obtained from the Bloomberg and the Reuters, which conduct regular surveys of financial institutions both in China and abroad every month before the official data releases of these monthly indicators (See Appendix D for a description of these market forecasts). Out of these monthly macroeconomic indicators, market forecasts for loans growth are only available from 2007 onwards. We therefore use month on month changes in loan growth as a proxy for the loan growth surprises. The sample used for the analysis of this paper spans from 4 January 2006 to 28 December 2007, the last trading day of 2007.
Methodology and model specification

Methodology
We adopt event study methodology to examine whether foreign pressure calling for RMB appreciation has any statistically significant impact on both the pace and the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate. To conduct an event study, one has to define the events, a window around the event, a success criterion, and a method to evaluate success criterion (Neely, 2005) . As mentioned above, our events are news reports related to external pressures calling for faster RMB appreciation. For the case of the Sino-US meeting weeks, our window is three weeks, one week before, during, and after a meeting. The events recorded by other indicators of external pressures are assumed to occur throughout the sample period. To test our hypotheses, we use both direction and statistical significance as evaluation criteria, that is, external pressures are 9 We also use the deviations from the interest rate parity condition as an explanatory variable and we obtain similar results. The results are available upon requests. 10 Foreign exchange reserve accumulation could also be included as one of the indicators to reflect external imbalances, but it is only announced every quarter. 11 In some occurrences, the data were announced before its official release date by news media quoting ad-hoc sources. The numbers quoted, however, do not always match the official numbers released. For consistency, we only rely on the data released on the official statistic release date.. successful if they brought about a statistically significant appreciation of the RMB exchange rate. 12 Following the existing literature, we adopt a GARCH model to empirically evaluate the success criteria, which we shall turn next.
Model specification
We test whether or not external pressures affect both the daily returns and the conditional volatility in the CNY/USD exchange rate. The model used to test such effects is specified as follows: 
are sufficient conditions to ensure a strictly positive conditional variance, 0 > t h . The ARCH effect, α , captures the short run persistence of shocks, and the GARCH effect, β , indicates the contribution of shocks to long run persistence, β α + .
The econometric difficulties associated with traditional event studies such as simultaneity and identification are less of a problem here. Contrary to foreign exchange interventions that occur simultaneously to the changes in the exchange rate, foreign pressures occur before the central parity rate is set, given the time difference. Furthermore, foreign exchange interventions are initiated as part of a domestic policy vis-à-vis the exchange rate and often as a reaction to its movements at the time of the intervention. Foreign political pressures, on the other hand, arise from abroad as an attempt to impact the long-term domestic policy on exchange rate. Hence, foreign pressures should be exogenous to both the daily returns of central parity rate and the RMB NDF.
We deal with the identification problem by using macroeconomic surprises, constructed as the deviation from market expectations surveyed among market participants. This implies that the macroeconomic surprises should be orthogonal to the external pressure indicators. Therefore, the identification problem is avoided in our specification. The use of macroeconomic surprises as exogenous control variables in exchange rate intervention models are common in the literature. 13 We are first interested in investigating the effect of external pressure on the daily returns of the RMB exchange rate. Both the control variables and the vector of pressure indicators are dated at t-1 as the central parity rate is set every morning before the trading day, whereas macroeconomic announcements occur throughout the trading day. A negative coefficient would indicate that external pressure lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate Next, we investigate the impact of foreign pressure on conditional volatility of the CNY/USD spot exchange rate. This is conducted by using a conditional volatility model in the spirit of Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986) . Following Neally (2005), we use a GARCH(1,1) model specification and the pressure indicators are also introduced in the conditional variance equation. A positive and significant coefficient on foreign pressure indicator would imply that foreign pressure tend to increase the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate. Finally, we repeat the exercise using the NDF rate instead of the central parity rate. Table 3 presents the empirical findings on the effect of the overall external pressure indicator in Column I and the US and non-US pressure indicators in Column II on both the mean and the conditional variance of the CNY/USD exchange rate. Other than the control variables and external pressure indicators as specified in Equation (1), we also add a dummy variable to account for the widening of the trading band of the RMB exchange rate on 18 May 2007.
Empirical results
The effect of external pressures on the central parity rate
We first look at the intercept term, the lagged daily returns variable of the CNY/USD exchange rate, and dummy variable for the widening of the trading band. The constant is always negative and significant, indicating that the CNY/USD exchange rate appreciates at a pace of 0.03% per day on average, holding other things equal. On the other hand, the lagged daily returns variable, which contains past information on the RMB, does not seem to be a good predictor for the future. In addition, the dummy variable for the effect of the widening of the trading band does not appear to be statistically significant, either. This suggests that the daily changes of the RMB exchange rate did not grow significantly larger even after the widening of the trade band.
None of the domestic macroeconomic news pertaining to the monetary conditions (financial institutional loan and M2), economic conditions (CPI, FAI and IP) and external imbalances (trade surplus) is statistically significant. Only the interest rate differential variable is statistically significant and with a positive sign. Given that the variable is measured as one-month LIBOR minus one-month CHIBOR, the positive coefficient of the interest rate differential variable implies that the larger the interest rate differential, the larger the depreciation of the CNY/USD exchange rate. However, one needs to be careful in interpreting this finding as the interest differential has been rising continuously throughout the sample period. Unlike most foreign exchange markets in industrialized economies, which react strongly to macro news, the central parity rate of CNY/USD market does not seem to be driven by fundamentals. This is in part expected because participation in the spot market is limited to a few traders authorised by the Chinese authorities. We shall see in Section 4.3 that this result no longer holds when looking at the non-deliverable forward market.
Next we turn to the effect of external pressure on the daily returns of the renminbi exchange rate. The sign of coefficient of the overall pressure indicator from all sources is negative, indicating that external pressure leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate as expected. However, the coefficient of this variable is not statistically significant. When examining the external pressure effects from the US and non-US sources in Column II, the coefficients associated with these variables have the expected negative signs, but are never statistically significant. Such findings suggest that external pressures do not appear to have any significant influence on the daily returns of the CNY/USD.
Contrary to the mean regression, we find that the overall external pressure indicator has a statistically significant and positive effect on the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate at the 5% level of significance (see variance equation in Table 3 ). This positive and significant effect is also present for both the US only and non-US pressure indicator (Column II). All coefficients of these pressure variables have positive signs, indicating that the external pressures increase the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate.
[ Table 2] 4.2 The effect of Sino-US meetings on the central parity rate
Our empirical findings so far have shown that external pressures, regardless sources, do not seem to affect the daily returns of the CNY/USD exchange rate. However, they do have statistically significant effect on the conditional volatility of the RMB exchange rate. A further and perhaps more interesting question to analyse is whether the bilateral Sino-US meetings bilateral on trade and currency issues, including the Sino-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED), have any notable influence on both the daily returns and conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate, as compared with other types of external pressures.
We continue to use the same explanatory variables to control for domestic factors as specified in Table 3 . However, we now further refine the specification of the US pressure indicator by creating a separate Sino-US meeting week variable and a US pressure variable without including these meetings. The Sino-US meeting week variable includes all 5 days of the week when a meeting was held (even though the meeting might run for 2-4 days only) so that we can investigate the effects of both daily changes and the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate before, during, and after a meeting week.
The empirical findings are presented in Table 4 . For the mean regression, most of the control variables and the dummy variable for the widening of the trading band continue to be statistically insignificant, while the constant and the interest rate differential variable remain statistically significant and positive. Column II presents the result without including the meeting week effect. The coefficient, though negative as expected, is still not statistically significant. But would the RMB exchange rate behave differently during the Sino-US meetings? Column III presents the results. We find that the Sino-US meeting indicators for the week before and after a meeting never show up to be statistically significant in affecting the daily changes of the RMB exchange rate and also have a positive sign, which suggests the CNY/USD rate actually depreciates over these periods. The coefficient for the indicator during the meeting week is negative, suggesting the change of the central parity rate of the CNY/USD exchange rate does appreciate somewhat. However, it is never statistically significant. Such findings also hold when we examine the Sino-US meeting indicators alone without including the other pressure indicators (Column III). Similarly, when excluding the meeting weeks, the coefficient of the US pressure indicator has a negative sign on the daily returns of the CNY/USD exchange rate, but is not statistically significant (Column IV). Note that Columns II to IV of Table 4 are robustness checks that intend to exhaust all the variants of US pressures.
14 Similar to what we have found in table 3 for the conditional volatility equation, the US pressure indicator excluding the effect of the meeting weeks continues to be statistically significant. The coefficient for the Sino-US meeting week is negative and significant in influencing the conditional volatility at the 5% significance level, suggesting that the conditional volatility actually declines during the meeting weeks on average. The coefficients for the meeting week indicators before and after a Sino-US meeting are positive, though not statistically significant. We find consistent results when focusing on the meeting indicators exclusively (Column III of Table 4) as we obtain similar results across specifications both in magnitude and statistical significance.
[ Table 4] 4.3 Do external political pressures affect the renminbi NDF rates?
Contrary to the central parity rate, the RMB NDF rate is mostly driven by domestic macroeconomic news (Table 5 ). All macroeconomic news except fixed asset investment growth is statistically significant. The two most important determinants of the NDF rate are both CPI inflation and broad money growth (M2) in terms of coefficient magnitude. Larger than expected growth in CPI, loans, industrial production and trade balance tend to signal significant appreciation of the NDF rates. On the other hand, surprises in broad money tend to signal depreciation. Moreover, as in the central parity case, the interest rate differential is significant and positive, but of a larger magnitude.
Non-US political pressures seem to have some effect on the 12-month NDF rate, though its coefficient is smaller in magnitude than the statistically significant domestic macroeconomic news. As shown in Table 6 , this result is consistent and robust to changes in specification. When examining the external pressure effects from the US, on the other hand, the sign of the coefficient is positive, different from the CPR case but nonetheless not significant. Moreover, overall external political pressures do not appear to have any statistically significant influence on the daily returns of the NDF rates. The sign of coefficient of the overall pressure indicator from all sources is negative for the 12-month NDF rate, indicating that external pressure leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate. These findings are quite consistent with the central parity results. Table 5 also shows that external political pressures do not appear to induce higher or lower conditional volatility unlike the results found for the central parity rate (see the variance equation)
[ Table 5] The Sino-US meetings do not have a statistically significant affect on the daily returns of the NDF rate but rather on its conditional volatility, as seen in Table 6 . The signs of the Sino-US meeting week (prior, during and post) variables are inconsistent across specification. External political pressures from the US, which excludes the Sino-US meetings, remains statistically insignificant but negative, indicating an appreciative effect. As in Table 4 , the conclusion drawn on the macroeconomic news variables in Table 5 still holds for Table 6 . On the other hand, the week of the Sino-US meeting variable is statistically significant and consistently increasing the NDF's conditional volatility, different from what we find in the CPR case. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the week before the meeting variable affects significantly and negatively conditional volatility. The results imply that the market anticipates the Sino-US meetings and that trading becomes less volatile the week before the meetings, where as the conditional volatility of the NDF rate tend to increase during a week when US delegations meet the Chinese ones.
[ Table 6] In sum, the RMB NDF market appears to be strongly driven by macroeconomic news, contrarily to the CNY/USD central parity rate. Furthermore, it seems that non-US external pressures have statistically significant effect in appreciating the NDF rate, offering some evidence that the market does react to political announcements directed at the RMB. The NDF's conditional volatility diminishes anticipatively the week preceding a meeting, and increases during the week of Sino-US meetings. These empirical evidences show the outcome of these meetings help induce some market reactions.
Do political pressures affect the RMB in the long run? Some Discussions
So far, this paper has shown that there is little evidence that external political pressures have had an effect on either the central parity rate or the NDF rate on a daily basis. Should one therefore conclude that such political pressures do not influence either the authority setting the CPR or the market participants in the NDF market? It is arguable that the significant effect recorded on the conditional variance could itself be evidence that external political pressures are being effective by introducing market uncertainty and raising the probability of larger future CNY/USD appreciations. This evidence appears to be consistent across specifications when investigating both the central parity rate and the NDF rate. In the CPR case, US, non-US and Sino-US meetings have statistically significant effects, whereas in the NDF case only Sino-US meetings appear to have significant effects. Nonetheless, this evidence is somewhat indirect, as political pressures do not seem to affect directly daily returns of either the CPR or NDF in their first moment. It is also worth noting that although volatility models provide an appropriate framework to analyse the conditional volatility in high frequency data such as daily returns of exchange rate, the effect of external pressures on the returns may be harder to capture with daily data.
It can be argued that the success of political pressures in affecting the pace of the RMB's appreciation could be observed over a longer time horizon instead of on a day-to-day basis. This could be because that the decision makers of the exchange rate policy not only have to consider foreign political pressures but also domestic policy concerns such as vested interests in export industries. In some occasions, the daily CPR rate movements, which are controlled and timed, could be even used as policy tools to send messages countering foreign political pressures in order to satisfy domestic interests. This could provide another potential explanation for the lack of evidence found in the empirical section, as the persistence of external political pressures could possibly have an influence on both the CPR and the NDF over time. Unfortunately, it is not a simple task to demonstrate this point rigorously or within the current framework used in this paper. In order to provide some discussion, one would need recourse to circumstantial evidence and casual observations. One such circumstantial evidence is the accelerated pace of appreciation of the CNY/USD spot rate in 2007, compared to 2006, as a sign of success of external political pressures. On the other hand, it could also be related domestic concerns not captured by the macroeconomic variables used in this paper. The movements in the NDF market, however, seem to be well accounted for by domestic macroeconomic surprises, underlying its market determination.
Another example of longer run effect is presented in Table 7 which summarises some casual observations about the average daily returns of the CNY/USD exchange rate (CPR and NDF) over a 1-week window -before, during, or after 6 bilateral Sino-US meetings on trade and currency issues, including the Sino-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED). These casual observations are not a replacement for formal frameworks but are merely an illustration of the discussion developed in this section. A pattern is discernable as on average the renminbi appreciates faster during a meeting week than it does in a week before and a week after a bilateral meeting. The average weekly appreciation of the CPR is about 0.05% during a meeting week, compared to 0.003% and 0.007%, respectively, for the week before and the week after a bilateral meeting. On average, the CPR appreciates almost 2.7 times faster during a meeting week than the sample mean appreciation (spanning from January 2006 until December 2007). In particular, the weeks of Secretary Paulson's first visit to China, the first, second, and third Sino-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) all have generated relatively large weekly appreciations of the renminbi against the US dollar. Another interesting fact is that the average rate of appreciation of the week after a meeting often falls below its sample mean, suggesting that the pace of the exchange rate appreciation often slows after a meeting.
[ Table 7] Similarly to the CPR, the daily average appreciation of the RMB NDF rate during a meeting week is 0.04% on average. The NDF rate, on the other hand, appreciates more than the CPR on average (0.03%) after a meeting week. The average appreciations in both the meeting week and week following the meeting are larger than the mean appreciation calculated over the full sample (0.027%). Note also, that the NDF tends to depreciate on average before bilateral meetings. Judging from these casual observations, it would seem that the Sino-US meetings induce a larger appreciation of both the CPR and the NDF rate, unlike our formal findings in the previous section.
Lastly, the overall lack of significant effect from the external political pressures on both rates could also simply be attributed to errors in measuring the pressure variables, although we showed earlier that weighting news equally was not too restrictive. This would require revising the construction of the database on political pressures, however.
Conclusions
This paper adopts an event study methodology to investigate whether external pressures calling for faster RMB appreciation have any statistically significant effect on both the central parity rate of the CNY/USD exchange rate and the 12-month non-deliverable forward rate and their conditional volatility. We create a new dataset that collates RMB related statements made by foreign officials from the Reuters database and other sources such as the Library of Congress website. We quantify external pressures with several binary indicators and find that these indicators have no influence on daily changes of the CNY/USD exchange rate. However, they do appear to have a statistically significant impact on the conditional volatility of the RMB exchange rate, especially for those US pressure indicators. We further investigate the pressure from the US because it has been the key source of external pressures for more rapid RMB appreciation. Specifically, we analyse whether Sino-US meetings with focuses on the RMB exchange rate policy have any impact on both the conditional volatility and daily returns of the central parity rate of the renminbi against the US dollar. We find that the meetings do not necessarily have any impact on daily returns of the RMB exchange rate. Moreover, the indicator for Sino-US meeting week has a negative influence on the conditional volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate, implying that volatility declines during the meeting week.
Our analysis indicates that external pressures have no statistically significant effect in affecting the pace of central parity rate. It appears that the pace of the CNY/USD appreciation is mostly based on domestic policy concerns. In particular, the US-China interest rate differential, a key measure of the costs of sterilisation, appears to be an important determinant in affecting the pace of the RMB appreciation. However, foreign pressures and especially the pressures coming from the United States do have statistically significant effect on the volatility of the CNY/USD exchange rate. On the other hand, domestic macroeconomic news is statistically important in determining the 12-month NDF rate. Moreover, there appears to be some limited evidence that non-US political pressures directed at the RMB tend to appreciate the 12-month NDF rate. Although statistically significant, the magnitude of the non-US pressures in affecting the NDF rate is much smaller than that of each macroeconomic surprise. The Sino-US meetings also make the NDF more volatile, consistent with the central parity rate results.
Our findings appear to have reinforced the notion that external pressure is unlikely to yield any major changes in China's exchange rate policy, although they make the daily movements of the renminbi exchange rate as well as the 12-month NDF rate more volatile. Indeed, it seems that other domestic policy concerns not captured in our model have so far been the key determinant in affecting the appreciation of the central parity rate, whereas the domestic macroeconomic news are the main factors in determining the NDF movements.
Although our findings show that foreign political pressures have little impact on the pace of the renminbi exchange rate, it does not exclude the possibility that persistent external pressures on the RMB exchange rate introduce market uncertainty and raise the probability of larger future CNY/USD appreciations in the long run. This is indeed an interesting question that deserves further research.
People's Bank of China, (2006) The dependent variable is the daily return of the RMB exchange rate and all explanatory variables are lagged one period. All regressions follow the GARCH(1,1) model and are estimated by maximum likelihood using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) maximization algorithm. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. An asterisk * denotes statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than 0.00005. The dependent variable is the daily return of the RMB exchange rate and all explanatory variables are lagged one period. All regressions follow the GARCH(1,1) model and are estimated by maximum likelihood using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) maximization algorithm. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. An asterisk * denotes statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than 0.00005. Model of column II could not converge using the same specification as all other models. The starting values were consequently modified to achieve convergence.
Table 5. Regression Results for the RMB NDF 12 Months
The dependent variable is the daily return of the NDF 12 Months rate and all explanatory variables are lagged one period. All regressions follow the GARCH(1,1) model and are estimated by maximum likelihood using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) maximization algorithm. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. An asterisk * denotes statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than 0.00005. Model of column II could not converge using the same specification as all other models. The starting values were consequently modified to achieve convergence. The dependent variable is the daily return of the NDF 12 Months rate and all explanatory variables are lagged one period. All regressions follow the GARCH(1,1) model and are estimated by maximum likelihood using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) maximization algorithm. Bollerslev-Wooldrige robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. An asterisk * denotes statistical significance at the 95% confidence level. The sign ## indicates that the figure is smaller than 0.00005. Model of column II could not converge using the same specification as all other models. The starting values were consequently modified to achieve convergence. The currency system was transformed from a fixed exchange rate system to a managed float regime with reference to a basket of currencies. The RMB/USD exchange rate was immediately adjusted to 8.11 representing a 2.1% appreciation from the existing rate of 8.28. Under the new system, the RMB was allowed to be traded against the US dollar within a daily trading band of +/-0.3% around a central parity rate, which was set daily to the closing market rate of the previous trading day. The trading of renminbi against the Euro, Japanese yen and Hong Kong dollar was arranged similarly with a wider trading band of +/-1.5% to account for the fluctuations of these currencies against the US dollar in the international markets.
Sep 2005
The daily trading band for non-US dollar currencies was widened from 1.5% to 3.0%.
Jan 2006
Over-the-counter (OTC) trading was introduced to the interbank foreign exchange market, in addition to the existing system of centralized trading. A number of financial institutions were designated market makers, and obligated to quote bid/ask prices and provide liquidity to the market The RMB/USD central parity rate would be calculated every morning as a weighted average of exchange rates quoted from the market makers. The weights would be set according to their quotes and volume of trading. The central parity rates for the renminbi against the Euro, Japanese yen and Hong Kong dollar would be converted from the RMB/USD central parity rate according to the cross exchange rates between the US dollar and these currencies in the international foreign exchange markets at 9am.
May 2007
The daily trading band for RMB/USD exchange rate was widened from +/-0.3% to +/-0.5% around the central parity rate.
Memorandum Items: Date Major Development 1981
An internal settlement rate was established for trade-related foreign transactions in addition to the existing official rate. The trade-related exchange rate was set to 2.8 RMB/USD while the prevailing official rate was 1.5 RMB/USD. 1 Jan 1985
The trade-related exchange rate was abolished and the official exchange rate was maintained at 2.8 RMB/USD. Mar 1988 Dozens of foreign exchange adjustment centers were established, in which the renminbi was traded among market participants at a foreign exchange swap rate. The swap rate was determined by the market but subject to interventions from the People's Bank of China. 1985 The official RMB/USD exchange rate was gradually devalued from 2.8 in 1985 to 5.22 on 17 Nov 1990. 1 Jan 1994
The official and swap rates were unified and the official RMB/USD exchange rate was devalued from 5.7 to 8. Trade balance is in billion USD and other indicators are in % year-on-year growth. The median forecasts are taken from Reuters, except for investment, which is from Bloomberg. The numbers correspond to the months in which they are announced. Since the statistical releases for the indicators above are lagged by one month, a trade balance announcement in January 2006, for example, would refer to the actual trade balance in December 2005. Since the statistical bureau usually releases production and investment figures for the period of January and February combined due to the Chinese New Year, a moving holiday that may fall in either month, the forecasts reported in March referred to the same two-month period as well.
